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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent violations of humanitarian law and human rights, became the apogee of Russia’s political ambitions as a former empire and triggered numerous debates and scenarios about what this empire should be — or rather, what it must cease to be — in the future.
The Russian authorities’ aspirations are largely grounded in the idea that Russia should occupy a unique position on the global stage. For example, the new unified history textbook, developed under the supervision of presidential adviser Vladimir Medinsky, frequently refers to Russia “returning” “its ancestral lands”. In effect, the state is oriented towards retrotopia and against modernity, attempting to demonstrate its superiority to the world. In this sense, 2022 clearly showed that the idea of “uniqueness” is not only a political slogan but also a deeply rooted sentiment familiar to many Russian citizens: it was actively used to legitimise the war in Ukraine.
As early as autumn 2022, discussions about the contours of Russia’s decolonisation were taking place in a variety of formats and at various levels. At least some of these discussions focused exclusively on Russia’s defederalisation, the status of national republics within the country, and related topics. We, however, wanted to create a project that would comprehensively explore not only the paths and methods of decolonisation, but first and foremost seek an answer to the question: what makes Russians gravitate (consciously and unconsciously) towards empire — towards arrogance and intolerance? What makes these patterns so persistent?
Our team had been discussing the project idea since autumn 2022, when, after the first wave of the so-called “partial mobilisation” announced in Russia, some citizens left the country, including to post-Soviet states. Almost immediately, media and social networks were filled with accounts of Russians’ behaviour abroad that could not be explained simply by a lack of education or previous travel experience.
These accounts revolved around rude statements and public remarks often directed at residents of Tbilisi, Yerevan, Almaty, and Bishkek, which could be summarised as: “You do realise how lucky you are…” The implication was that smarter, more “advanced” designers, journalists, café owners, and the “cultural elite” had arrived in these cities and would now “put things in order”. Predictably, this led to significant tension among residents.
The project idea is to create a platform (dialogue-based, educational, and public-outreach oriented) that will give Russians an opportunity to discuss and reflect on the current situation, the past, and the future — including questions of responsibility and ways to ensure that the war in Ukraine can never be repeated.
The idea grew out of the team’s previous experience in dialogue, civil society, and educational initiatives implemented in Ukraine after 2014 and in Ukraine–Russia initiatives between 2014 and 2022. Some of these projects were closed immediately after the full-scale invasion began, while others were transformed into documentation of war crimes and human rights violations.
It was important for us to build specifically on dialogue work — which, from our perspective, is the most humanistic and at the same time one of the most profound methods of transforming conflict and the human being in conflict.
Our previous experience working together with complex phenomena helped us start building a concept that would integrate academic and applied work on imperiality and its derivatives. Even at this stage, we encountered a lack of both theoretical and practical knowledge about how to transform a former empire into a democratic and humanistic society that does not threaten its neighbours; what methods exist to help a society move away from chauvinistic views and transform hubris and a sense of superiority while preserving healthy pride in one’s country and culture.
Therefore, the first part of the project is a study: collecting information and mapping experts and practitioners who could approach the deconstruction of imperiality from a qualitatively new perspective. In this work, we combine tools and approaches from education and practice areas related to historical memory, human rights, and conflict transformation.
We understood that we would be working with an exceptionally complex phenomenon against the backdrop of an acute phase of war.
Given that topics related to imperiality, national pride, and hubris remain insufficiently developed in the region from a scholarly perspective — while having long been institutionalised by politicians and surrounded by myths and stereotypes — we saw our primary task as creating a space where a conversation about these issues would be possible and safe.
In the project, imperiality is understood as a complex system of ideas that includes myths of greatness and a “special path”, where dominant cultural narratives become instruments of domination. Imperiality results from a cluster of causes that may involve, to varying degrees, economic pressure, human aggression and greed, historical trauma, the search for security, the desire for power and prestige, nationalist emotions, humanism, and many other factors. This mixture of motives complicates both a precise understanding of the phenomenon and efforts to dismantle it.
The term deimperialisation denotes the process of transforming imperiality, including the deconstruction of myths of national superiority and the search for alternative identity models. We consider dialogue and a humanistic approach essential to this work.
Moving away from debates over terms and a single “correct” definition. Our task is not to answer what kinds of empires exist, whether Russia is an empire, or whether it meets all the criteria of an empire. What mattered more was understanding what ensures the popularity and resilience of ideas that ultimately lead to bloody wars for which no one takes responsibility. Depending on the context, we agreed to call this broader phenomenon imperiality, and we use this term throughout the project and in this report.
Naming the transition towards a healthy (non-threatening to itself and others) state as deimperialisation. At the same time, we recognise Russia’s specific features. As Alexander Etkind writes: “…Having colonised numerous lands, Russia applied colonial regimes of indirect rule — coercive, communitarian, and exoticising — to its own population. Russia was both the subject and the object of colonisation and its consequences, such as, for example, Orientalism.”
Combining a retrospective lens with an orientation towards the future. We aimed to analyse how the views described above evolved and what alternatives attempted to resist them. We want to understand the past to move forward — to think about the future without being trapped in backward-looking nostalgia.
At the same time, we consider it necessary to move away from “retromania” (or, as Zygmunt Bauman defined it, “retrotopia”) — constant digging into the past and longing for a lost “golden age”.
Maintaining a subject-centred, humanistic focus and a human rights-based approach. This includes relying on personal experience, avoiding sweeping generalisations, and applying the “nothing about us without us” principle. Crucially, when working with conflict, it also means continuing to see the human being, even in a viewer of Channel One. Rehumanisation in deimperialisation work prevents us from becoming propagandists willing to impose shocking formats of “identity replacement”.
Analysing global and local levels simultaneously. Deimperialisation in education, media, and the arts will be impossible without a full understanding of the instruments through which political regimes sustain the popularity and prevalence of imperial ideas. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that people make everyday choices in favour of national hubris and collective narcissism — choices rooted in deep fears, needs, and interests. The state has found the key to these people; civil society must find it too.
We understand that it is extremely difficult for a small initiative to counter aggression quickly and effectively, especially as the current situation is becoming unique: it requires working with a society that has not processed the traumatic past of totalitarianism and wars, and that has been shaped by years of propaganda promoting an imperial worldview.
As noted above, in this project, we deliberately move away from strictly academic disputes over terminology in favour of adopting our own working language. As one expert put it in an interview: “We understand that we are sick. Since we already agree on this, let’s not look for a name for the disease — let’s discuss how to treat it.”
By imperiality we mean not only (and not so much) the state policy of the Russian authorities, but also chauvinism, hubris, ideas of superiority and righteousness, narratives of “common history” and “fraternal peoples”, and other mythologemes that remain unreflected by many Russians — including within civil society, even among those who see themselves as carriers of democratic and human rights values.
Although these views and mythologemes may appear harmless, they nonetheless provide fertile ground for manipulation that mobilises and consolidates society around armed aggression against neighbouring countries or around the rejection of “foreign” phenomena within one’s own country.
At the same time, unreflected imperiality fuels constant tension and simmering conflicts between Russian émigrés and residents of the countries to which they have moved. At the civil society level, this can manifest, for example, when Russian media working in Russian promote the idea that it is easier to fund them than independent Belarusian outlets because “we write in Russian anyway”.
In our view, analysing manifestations of imperiality and searching for alternatives for further transformation should become a key element of the work of civil society organisations and NGOs in Russia — especially if this work is oriented towards the future, rather than only towards supporting specific vulnerable groups.
In this report, we summarise the lessons learned during the project’s first year (May 2023 to March 2024). This concludes the research phase of our work, after which we moved to organising the educational and outreach components.
Aim of the study. The study examined a body of ideas that analyse and interpret various aspects of national chauvinism and imperiality (politics of memory, coloniality, language, social research, psychology, museum work, media, propaganda, education, human rights work, and others), as well as practices that propose their deconstruction, transformation, and the search for alternatives.
Initially, we did not have a single formulated research hypothesis; however, in retrospect, it can be described as follows:
Given the resources available and the complexity of the topic, we chose interdisciplinary group meetings and in-depth interviews as our primary research methods. The interviews served as preparation for the meetings and allowed us to engage experts who work on different aspects of the topic but, for various reasons, could not attend the meetings.
Over the course of the project, two meetings were held, with a total of 32 participants. In-depth interviews were conducted with all meeting participants as well as with a broader circle of experts. The total number of in-depth interviews was 54.
The first meeting (Chisinau, August 2023) was organised as an exchange among academic researchers: sociologists, historians, ethnopolitical scientists, linguists, and anthropologists.
The second meeting (Vilnius, March 2024), in addition to representatives of academia, included practitioners from various fields of social work and public engagement: artists, museum professionals, theatre directors and playwrights, human rights defenders, facilitators, journalists, decolonial activists, big data analysts, and others. The two meeting groups did not overlap (except for one person).
Most participants were Russian citizens or had lived in the Russian Federation. By the time of the meetings, many no longer resided in Russia but maintained close professional, family, and personal ties. Several participants represented Indigenous peoples of Russia. In addition to Russians, citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Estonia also took part. Some participants were experts on Central Asia, the peoples of Siberia, and the North Caucasus. There were also participants from the LGBTQIA+ community.
Before each meeting, we set different goals.
The first meeting was needed for an academic discussion and for clarifying how the scholarly community approaches the understanding of imperiality.
Its objectives were:
The second meeting focused on networking, becoming familiar with participants’ practices, and forming a pool of partners for the future educational programme and outreach work within the project. It was also important for us to test the answers and hypotheses offered by the academic participants of the first meeting.
Each meeting was conducted in a facilitated format. Participants were offered questions related to imperial thinking and worked through them individually, in pairs or trios, and in small or large groups, depending on the meeting’s objectives. Each meeting was led by at least one facilitator from Russia and one facilitator from Ukraine. Each meeting consisted of two full days, with four sessions per day. The outcomes of group discussions were documented in writing during the meetings and became the basis for this report and for developing the remaining project components.
A project psychologist was present at each meeting so that participants could seek support or discuss difficult emotional experiences.
Preparation for each meeting included individual interviews with each potential participant to discuss objectives, format, and participation specifics, and to assess willingness to work within the proposed format. During the interviews, participants also identified topics and questions they considered important. Selected participants received a list of questions in advance as preparation.
As mentioned above, we intentionally rejected strictly academic work aimed at clarifying terminology and producing a unified definition of imperiality. From the very beginning, we also consciously avoided making political issues and hypothetical scenarios for the future of the Russian Federation and its statehood a mandatory part of the agenda. We did not restrict these discussions when they arose during the meetings; however, for us it was more important to discuss not the paths to defederalisation or concrete political scenarios, but the possibility of deimperialisation, its psychological dimension, and the human factor.
When selecting potential participants, we decided not to invite people from Ukraine. The topic of the war in Ukraine was already central to the entire project and, of course, present at both meetings; however, our goal was not to discuss dialogue or reconciliation scenarios, nor did we aim to focus on Ukraine–Russia relations.
During the research phase, we focused on developing a body of questions about imperiality that could foster dialogue and reflection. The purpose of the meetings was not to find a single correct answer, but to engage in dialogue, exchange views, and generate new questions without which it is impossible to move forward.
The list for each meeting was compiled based on in-depth interviews with experts and further supplemented by our team through review of theoretical texts on imperial and colonial discourse and processes.
The nature and components of imperial thinking and discourse
Drivers and markers of imperiality
What is important to consider when working on deimperialisation
Participants were asked to reflect in advance:
Below we present a structured summary of the experts’ work during the project’s in-person meetings. The range of questions is extensive and covers many fields of knowledge and practice. Given the project’s resources, we did not aim to discuss everything, and each time, the choice of a specific topic was made by the working group.
It is important to note that the findings and generalisations presented here do not claim universality, are not the only possible approach, and reflect subjective conclusions shaped by participants’ experiences and identities.
In this section, we present results on:
Participants analysed positions (what is said), interests (what is beneficial), needs (what is truly important), and fears of people who hold imperial views.
We proceed from the assumption that each of us carries certain stereotypes, prejudices, and habitual patterns of behaviour and language that may manifest as imperiality. Thus, imperiality is understood here as a spectrum: a person may occupy different points on this spectrum at different moments.
Imperiality as a position often relies on:
Key interests included:
Needs and fears — what truly touches people, but becomes the object of manipulation and the basis of propaganda in national chauvinism:
From our perspective, reflection on and exploration of these deep needs should be at the core of deimperialisation practice. If we reduce everything to “all imperialists are victims of propaganda”, meaningful change becomes impossible. Understanding what imperiality gives people — and which needs it meets — is key to finding a sustainable humanistic alternative.
Our theoretical research, interviews, and subsequent discussions with experts suggest that the widespread popularity of imperial ideas is ensured by a high level of synchronisation between established social structures, state institutions, and everyday practices. This process would not have been possible if it did not also resonate with what “hurts” for individuals and groups in society.
Thus, mass support for imperial ideas is sustained by a combination of state instruments and institutions responding to social demand:
In our study, we devoted significant attention to historical processes, as contemporary Russian imperiality draws heavily on the past — both at the level of explicit statements and at the level of mythologemes.
Experts stressed that the active use of historical parallels and emphases — in government rhetoric and in everyday discourse — requires separate and thorough research. At the Chisinau meeting, we discussed figures and key “facts” of imperial historiography whose roles are artificially exaggerated and presented through a particular lens.
Selected examples:
These themes become core mechanisms for constructing the imperial myth. At the same time, the group believes that with a shift in approach and interpretation, these three themes could become a basis for rebuilding norms and society.
Repressions and the Great Terror.
⬦ Constitutional patriotism (drawing on Germany’s experience): “We are Germans and are ready to acknowledge shameful pages of history; we are mature enough as a nation to work through this.”
⬦ Maximum personalisation of discourse rather than speaking on behalf of groups — because it is impossible to take on a group’s experience if you do not belong to that group.
⬦ Move away from the perpetrator–victim dichotomy, as many perpetrators of the 1920s were themselves repressed in the 1930s.
⬦ Exit the ‘progressor’ position: stop imposing a conversation about repression from a position of power.
⬦ Account for psychological fragility of all participants in discussions about repression.
⬦ Return history itself (sources, complexity, plurality) instead of ideology and mythology.
World War II.
The 1990s.
Discussions of practices, approaches, values, and tools that could facilitate deimperialisation — a move away from imperiality towards humanistic values and practices — were a key focus of both meetings. The search for alternative scenarios is precisely the proactive mode that is urgently needed now. Yes, we can agree that imperiality is “bad” — but what, then, is “good”, and who and how can invent and implement it?
In the search for broader alternatives, the following reference points were identified:
What can a Russian rely on if the chauvinism that often provides the “core” is removed? Here, the concept of nationality is crucial: for a Yakut or Bashkir, it may be easier to speak about national identity than for a Russian who has no distinct national traditions left — or whose traditions were appropriated by the empire and therefore devalued.
We devoted significant attention to the totalising nature of empire, its drive for unification, and therefore the eradication of difference. Decoloniality and restoring voice to a wide range of oppressed groups must become a necessary foundation for overcoming imperiality. This includes not only the “liberation of peoples”, but also the dissemination of inclusivity, feminism, the humanisation of biopolitics, and related values. Decoloniality also implies that it will be impossible simply to copy foreign processes and practices; tools must be tested and developed to fit the Russian context.
Paths to achieving it, and criteria for a future that is minimally acceptable and genuinely desirable. This is the most politicised aspect of deimperialisation work; it carries the greatest risks, yet is both inevitable and necessary.
When discussing alternatives, it is essential to maintain a set of “filters” — criteria that help distinguish tools and practices that truly contribute to deimperialisation from those that are merely covert instruments of “good propaganda”.
During the meeting, the following filters were formulated:
“As a first step, you need to recognise the imperial mindset in yourself before you go and try to change other people.”
TOOLS
PRINCIPLES
TOPICS
AREAS OF WORK
The conducted research and the feedback received from participants allow us to state with confidence that deimperialisation and societal humanisation are critically important, and at the same time remain insufficiently researched and reflected upon even among civil society actors and independent journalists.
The data obtained — both presented in this report and remaining within our team’s materials — will serve as the basis for developing a dialogue-and-education programme for Russians aimed at advancing deimperialisation, reflecting on one’s own imperiality, collective narcissism, and national hubris, and exploring practical and conceptual alternatives.
We present below the key conclusions and recommendations that we consider essential and that guide our work:
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